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Abstract
This note shows how the frequent occurrence of seeing exceedingly high
claims in disputes and litigations can be rationalized by a model in which
claimants display reference dependent preferences, expect the judge to use a
generalized social welfare function, and strategically announce their reference
points.
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1 Introduction
In disputes and litigations it is common to observe litigants asking for exceedingly
high claims that are often mutually inconsistent. The existence of subjective
Contact: gallice@econ.unito.it
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behavioral biases that inuence agentsperception of fairness and lead claimants
to overestimate how much they deserve certainly contributes to generating such
a phenomenon. For instance, it is well known that self-serving bias can create
costly impasses in bargaining and negotiations (see Babcock et al., 1995, and
Babcock and Lowenstein, 1997). But while behavioral biases unconsciously a¤ect
individualsclaims, the announcement of a very high claim can also be the result of
a conscious and strategic decision by the parties. Litigants can in fact purposively
exaggerate their claims with the goal of inuencing the nal allocation that the
judge will implement.
In this note, we explore this second option and investigate the strategic aspects
related to agentsannouncement of their claims. We show that, in a framework
of reference dependent preferences à la Koszegi and Rabin (2006), claimants who
expect the judge to make the nal decision according to a very general form of
social welfare function have an interest in purposively inating their claims.
Reference dependent preferences (RDPs) capture the famous loss aversion con-
jecture introduced in the classic article by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). RDPs
explicitly acknowledge the fact that agentsperception of a given outcome is inu-
enced by the comparison between the outcome itself and a certain ex-ante reference
point. More precisely, people dene gains and losses with respect to the reference
point and losses loom larger than gains. RDPs thus seem particularly appropriate
to depict the preferences of individuals involved in disputes and litigations. These
are in fact typical situations in which agents build their own expectations about
the allocation that the authority will implement and inevitably ex-post compare
the actual outcome with the expected one.
To sum up, the analysis presented in this paper applies to all those cases
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in which reference dependent preferences constitute an appropriate framework,
conicting interests of the agents must be settled by an external authority, and
litigants have the possibility to ex-ante declare what they expect to get. Examples
include trials, divorces, reimbursements for damages, and political negotiations.
2 The model
We model the situation of two claimants who cannot agree on how to divide a
homogeneous and perfectly divisible good (whose amount we normalize to S =
1). The litigants thus delegate the choice and the implementation of the nal
allocation of the good to a judge/planner. Let x = (x1; x2) indicate a possible
allocation such that xi is the amount of the good that the planner assigns to
claimant i 2 f1; 2g. Feasible allocations are the ones for which xi 2 [0; 1] for any
i and
P
i xi  1.
The litigants expect (perhaps incorrectly) that the judge, in choosing which
nal allocation to implement, will use a generalized utilitarian social welfare func-
tion of the form W (u) =
P
i g(ui) where g() is an increasing and strictly concave
function and ui is the utility of claimant i 2 f1; 2g. The concavity of g() implies
that the planner attaches progressively lower weight to additional units of utility.
In particular, the more concave is g(), the more egalitarian will be the nal alloca-
tion (see Atkinson, 1970). As suchW (u) includes all those cases that fall between
two well-known extremes. On one hand, as g() approaches a linear function,
W (u) tends to the purely utilitarian SWF (Bentham, 1789): Wut (u) =
P
i ui.
On the other hand, as g() becomes innitely concave, W (u) approaches the
maxmin or Rawlsian SWF (Rawls, 1971): Wmm (u) = min fu1; :::; ung.
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For what concerns claimantsutility function, we assume that individual pref-
erences are such that:
u(xi; ri) = xi + (xi   ri) (1)
where the function () is a universal gain-loss function. Given the individual
reference point ri 2 [0; 1], (xi   ri) reects the additional e¤ects that perceived
gains or losses have on u() on top of the utility the agent gets from the direct
possession/consumption of xi. In other words, we assume that claimants display
reference dependent preferences a la Koszegi and Rabin (2006).1 The function
() satises the following properties:
P1: (xi  ri) is strictly increasing in xi, decreasing in ri, and such that (0) = 0.
P2: (xi   ri) is continuous for any xi and di¤erentiable for any xi 6= ri.
P3: 0xi(xi   ri) =  for xi < ri and 0xi(xi   ri) =  for xi > ri with  >  > 0.
In line with the original prospect theory formulation of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), the function () is thus characterized by a kink at xi = ri and is steeper
in the domain of losses than in the domain of gains. Notice that P3 implies that
the function () is linear, as its rst derivative with respect to xi is a constant. As
such, we do not capture the diminishing sensitivity of perceived gains or losses.2
1Koszegi and Rabin (2006) actually introduce a more general family of utility functions given
by u(xi; ri) = m(xi) + (m(xi) m(ri)) where m() is an increasing function that captures the
direct e¤ect of xi on total utility u(). In this note, we thus set m(xi) = xi.
2 In addition to the properties here described in P1 and P2, Koszegi and Rabin (2006) also
dene an additional property (labeled A3 in their paper): 00xi(xi   ri) > 0 for xi < ri and
00xi(xi   ri) < 0 for xi > ri, i.e., the function () is convex for perceived losses and concave for
perceived gains. In examples and applications, they then substitute A3 with A30: 00xi(xi ri) = 0,
i.e., a linear functional form like the one we assume here in P3.
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We do not investigate the issue of how agents introspectively select their refer-
ence points ri.3 We focus instead on the issue of how claimants should strategically
announce their reference points to the judge with the goal of inuencing, obvi-
ously in their own interest, the nal allocation of the good. We thus introduce
rai 2 [0; 1], the key variable of the model, which indicates the reference point that
agent i announces to the judge. Notice that rai may di¤er from ri, i.e., what an
agent declares to expect (rai ) may di¤er from what he actually expects (ri).
2.1 The planners problem
In this section we solve the planners problem from the claimantspoint of view.
Claimants announce to the planner what they expect to get (i.e., the planner
knows the vector ra = (ra1 ; r
a
2)). They then think, somewhat naively, that the
planner sets r = ra. As such, litigants expect the planner to face and solve the
following problem:
max
x1;x2
W (u) = [g (x1 + (x1   ra1)) + g (x2 + (x2   ra2))] s.t. x1 + x2 = 1 (2)
The problem has a solution given that W (u) is a continuous function dened
on the closed and bounded space [0; 1]  [0; 1] and thus the Weierstrass theorem
applies. Moreover W (u) is concave (it is the sum of two concave functions) such
that rst order conditions are su¢ cient. The optimal allocation x^ = (x^1; x^2),
3Agents can set their own ri in line with what they have or are used to (as in the traditional
status quo formulation of Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), with what they expect (as proposed in
Koszegi and Rabin, 2006), or with what they think they deserve, just to name a few possibilities.
The choice of ri can also be plagued by unconscious behavioral biases. For instance, Gallice
(2011) studies the implications of self-serving biased reference points.
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where x^ = argmaxW (u) and x^2 = 1  x^1, will thus equalize the marginal utilities
of the two claimants:
[g0 (x^1 + (x^1   ra1))] (1 + 0(x^1   ra1)) =
= [g0 (1  x^1 + (1  x^1   ra2))] (1 + 0(1  x^1   ra2))
(3)
Now notice that, given that the function () is linear, its derivative 0() is a
constant (property P3). In particular, whenever a) x^i < rai for both agents or b)
x^i > r
a
i for both agents, then 
0(x^1   ra1) = 0(1  x^1   ra2) for any x^1. From now
on we focus on these two cases (i.e., we ignore the situations such that x^i < rai
for i 2 f1; 2g and x^j > raj for j 6= i). We will later check that one of the two cases
(more precisely case a) is indeed the one that emerges in equilibrium.
The fact that 0(x^1   ra1) = 0(1   x^1   ra2) for any x^1 implies that (3) is
satised if and only if (4) holds:

g0 (x^1 + (x^1   ra1))

=

g0 (1  x^1 + (1  x^1   ra2))

(4)
The function g() is strictly concave and monotonically increasing, which im-
plies that its derivative g0() is monotonically decreasing. It follows that (4) holds
if and only if the two arguments are the same:
(x1 + (x^1   ra1)) = (1  x^1 + (1  x^1   ra2)) (5)
We are now in the position to study the e¤ects that the announced reference
point rai has on x^i. Focusing without loss of generality on claimant i = 1, we can
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express (5) as:
F (x^1; r
a
1) = 2x^1 + (x^1   ra1)  (1  x^1   ra2)  1 = 0 (6)
This is an implicit function that satises the assumptions of the implicit-
function theorem. In fact, property P2 of the gain-loss function () ensures that
partial derivatives @F (x^1;r
a
1 )
@x^1
and @F (x^1;r
a
1 )
@ra1
are continuous and di¤erent from zero
for any x1 < ra1 . Total di¤erentiation of F (x^1; r
a
1) leads to:
@(x^1   ra1)
@ra1
+

2 +
@(x^1   ra1)
@x^1
  @(1  x^1   r
a
2)
@x^1

@x^1
@ra1
= 0 (7)
such that @x^1@ra1
can be expressed as:
@x^1
@ra1
=  
@(x^1 ra1 )
@ra1
2 +
@(x^1 ra1 )
@x^1
  @(1 x^1 ra2 )@x^1
(8)
The numerator of the ratio is negative (by property P1) and the denominator
is positive. In particular, the second term is positive (again by P1) while the third
one is negative given that x^2 decreases as x^1 increases. It follows that @x^1@ra1
> 0.
Because of symmetry, the same inequality obviously also holds for claimant i = 2
such that we can state the main result of this note:
@x^i
@rai
> 0 for any i 2 f1; 2g (9)
Given that the utility of claimant i is strictly increasing in xi,4 this result
indicates that agent i, even though he anticipates that he will possibly get x^i < rai ,
4 In particular, @u(xi;ri)
@xi
= 1 + 0xi(xi   ri) > 0 given that 0xi(xi   ri) > 0 (see property P3
of the  function).
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should purposely inate his initial claim. In fact, the nal allocation agent i gets
(x^i) is positively anchored to the reference point that the agent announces (rai ).
It follows that in general rai > ri, i.e., the announced reference point will be larger
than the truereference point (rai = ri will happen only when ri = 1).
In the Nash equilibrium of this announcement game, both agents will thus
announce r^ai = 1. In line with the social welfare function W (u), the judge will
thus implement the Solomonic solution x^ =

1
2 ;
1
2
	
.5 As such, condition x^i < r^ai
holds for both claimants and thus conrms the validity of the passages that we
implemented in moving from (3) to (4).
The following example uses very simple functional forms for g() and () to
illustrate the result established in (9) as well as the equilibrium of the game.
Example 1 Let g() = p, (xi ri) =
8<: xi   ri if xi  ri2(xi   ri) if xi < ri for i 2 f1; 2g and
ra = fra1 ; ra2g. Then ui =
8<: 2xi   rai if xi  rai3xi   2rai if xi < rai . Claimants thus expect the
planner to maximize the function W (u) =
p
3x1   2ra1 +
p
3x2   2ra2 . First order
condition is given by 3
 p
3x1   2ra1
 1
= 3
 p
3  3x1   ra2
 1
and the optimal
allocation is then given by x^ = (x^1; x^2) with x^1 = 12 +
1
3(r
a
1   ra2) and x^2 = 1  x^1.
Marginal e¤ects are strictly positive

@x^1
@ra1
= @x^2@ra2
= 13

and obviously they can also
be retrieved using equation (8). In equilibrium, we will have r^a = f1; 1g and
x^ =

1
2 ;
1
2
	
.
5The judges situation indeed resembles King Solomons problem of having to establish the
propertyof a baby between two women who both claimed to be his natural mother. As is well
known, King Solomons suggested solution was to cut the baby in half.
8
3 Conclusions
This note explored the strategic aspects that may underlie litigantsdecisions to
ask for exceedingly high claims. More precisely, the note showed that if claimants
are characterized by reference dependent preferences (an assumption that seems
particularly appropriate in the context of disputes and litigations), and if they
expect the judge to reach his decision in line with the maximization of a very
general form of social welfare function, then there is indeed an incentive for agents
to announce high reference points. Claimants in fact anticipate that in the nal
allocation what they will get is positively anchored to their initial claims. As such,
they purposively inate these claims.
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